


PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE: THE WEB


MICHAEL ROITZSCH

THE WEB AS A DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM


WEB HACKING SESSION



SCENARIO



- user accesses a sensitive service
- attacker tries to disturb
- various complex layers
- independently developed technologies are being combined
- what you see may not be what you get...




- **goal:** manipulate state stored in the backend DB
- not directly accessible (hopefully)
- improper input checking in frontend server required
- nice: inconsistency is persistent

```
$password = $_POST['password'];  
  
$id = $_POST['id'];  
  
$sql = "UPDATE Accounts SET  
PASSWORD = '$password' WHERE  
account_id = $id";
```

Now imagine: password='; --

SQL injection

BOBBY TABLES



Comic by Randall Munroe, xkcd.com


LICENSE PLATE



- exploit other flaws in the application logic
- insufficient boundaries between users
 - Hotmail hole exposes mails of other users
- security by obscurity
 - URL guessing can expose hidden resources
- logic bombs
 - Mikeyy worm on Twitter used code injection via custom CSS to replicate

always sanitize input

FRONTEND



- **goal:** manipulate content delivered to the browser
- infrastructure attacks like DNS cache poisoning
- solution for this:
make sure you use SSL
- ... and check CRLs
- improper input checking
can still bite you

- `http://example.com/?query=query string`
- generates website containing:
`<p>You are looking for: query string</p>`
- so how about that:
`http://example.com/?query=HTML code`
- remember that?
`http://www.wolfgang-schaeuble.de/?search=</div>...`

STEPPING DOWN



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the following details:


- Toolbar:** Datei, Bearbeiten, Ansicht, Chronik, Lesezeichen, ScrapBook, Extras, Hilfe, Stumble!, I like it!, Chat.
- Address Bar:** http://www.wolfgang-schaeuble.de/?search=%3C/strong%3E%3C/div%
- Bookmark Bar:** heisec, Motorrad, Linux, Security, heise, search+, Telefon, Hotline, Heise online, c't Artikel, Wikipedia (D), Wikipedia, heisec.
- Page Title:** Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble MdB...
- Content Area:**
 - Portrait:** Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble MdB, Bundesminister des Innern.
 - Date:** 24.05.2008
 - Title:** Bundesinnenminister tritt zurück
 - Text:** wäre eine Meldung, die sicher viele gerne lesen würden. Allerdings handelt es sich nur um eine Cross-Site-Scripting-Schwachstelle im der Webseite des Politikers, der gerne die Online-Durchsuchung einführen möchte. Scherbolde können dadurch beliebige Meldungen unter der Domäne wolfgang-schaeuble.de erstellen.
Der Fehler liegt in der Suchfunktion des Internetauftritts, die HTML- und Skriptcode in Anfragen nicht ausfiltert. Grüße an dmk.
 - CDU Logo:** CDU
 - Search Bar:** Suchen...
 - Navigation:** Position, Veröffentlichungen und Interviews, Reden, Wahlkreis, Persönlich, Links, Kontakt.
 - Image:** A smaller image of Dr. Schäuble sitting in a chair, holding papers.

- sometimes this type of **HTML injection** is improperly called **cross-site scripting**
- injection (both HTML and SQL) can **become** cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks
- just embed <script> tags and send code
- this code will run with the privileges of the embedding site (think IE zones)
- the script can then operate the site for you

- Can you steal site credentials with this?
- imagine a bank website allowing injection
- What do we have?
 - user needs to click attacker-provided link
 - you could display a fake login form
 - even with some JavaScript
 - the browser would indicate proper SSL
- How do you get the password?

- JavaScript can access password fields
- you cannot use AJAX to get the password
- **same origin policy**
 - JavaScript may only connect back to the originating server (with some tolerance)
 - can be defeated with tags
 - encode password in URL to ping your server
 - JavaScript can also read cookies...

- fix web application
 - well...
- disallow cross-site image loading?
 - lots of sites use this
- no JavaScript access to password field?
 - AJAX logins need this



- **goal:** trick the browser to not show what's actually happening
- or: how to pull strings behind the user's back
- or: can one website control another one?
- no mischief with the server communication

- user visits a regular website you control
- Can you obtain credentials of a different site?
- some preconditions
 - user is logged in to the target site in another browser tab
 - the target site identifies the user session with a cookie
- no cross-site cookie leakage in browser

- same origin policy prevents AJAX to target
- again, is your friend
- one website can send arbitrary requests to another, unrelated site
- **cross site request forgery**
- a special case of the **confused deputy problem**
- requests are blindly operating the target

- send requests and GET parameters
 - click buttons in the UI of the target site
 - operate search fields and other text input
- basic or digest authentication? cookies?
 - browser automatically sends credential
 - **session riding**
- POST requests?
 - manufacture a <form> instead of

- study in late 2008: high-profile bank websites vulnerable
- DSL-Routers
 - disable firewall
 - reset wifi protection
 - enable UPnP
- browser-based port scanning
 - this is behind the corporate firewall

- disable cross-site POST requests
 - GET requests should by definition never change persistent state
 - there is a [Firefox plugin](#) for that
- never authenticate a change of persistent state by cookie only
- pass an additional credential
 - session ID in URL, edit tokens

Log in

Don't have an account? [Create an account.](#)

You must have cookies enabled to log in to OSWiki.


Username:

Password:

Remember my login on this computer

[Log in](#) [E-mail new password](#)

BLINDNESS



- **goal:** mislead the user to not seeing what's actually happening
- nothing going on behind your back
- the internal state of the browser is properly displayed
- but you don't notice...

www.paypal.com

CYRILLIC SMALL
LETTER A (U+0430)

LATIN SMALL LETTER A
(U+0061)

www.paypal.com

homograph attack

GENERALIZE

FRACTION SLASH
(U+2044)


<https://www.bank.com/account/login.ab.cd>


www.bank.xn--comaccountlogin-uh0iha.ab.cd


<https://www.bank.com/account/login.ab.cd>

www.bank.com

CONTENT







PayPal

Startseite | Privatkunden | Geschäftskunden | Shopping-Portal

Konto-Login 

E-Mail-Adresse

PayPal-Passwort

Einloggen

[E-Mail-Adresse oder Passwort vergessen?](#)

Neu bei PayPal? [Neu anmelden](#)

Das Prinzip PayPal.
Online zahlen – einfach und sicher.


 

[Über uns](#) | [Impressum](#) | [Kontotypen](#) | [Gebühren](#) | [Datenschutz](#) | [Sicherheit](#) | [Kontakt](#) | [AGB](#) | [Jobs](#) | [Sammelzahlung](#) |



Copyright © 1999-2009 PayPal. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.

CLICKJACKING



The screenshot shows an eBay product page for an AOC monitor. The monitor is displayed on the left, and the listing details are on the right. An orange arrow points to the 'Preis' (Price) field, which is set to '1 EUR'. Other details visible include the screen size (21,5"), response time (5 ms), and a note about 'Kostenloser Versand' (Free shipping). The seller information on the right indicates they have 134219 positive reviews and a 99,2% positive feedback rating.

- this only works when logged in
 - always log out explicitly
 - do not use persistent logins
- you may want to check whether your password manager autofills inside frames

Is everything lost?

Yes