

Software Sandboxes

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(slides stolen from Björn Döbel)



Sandboxing

Outline: Isolation

- Why and what to isolate?
- Machine-Level Isolation
 - Virtual Machines
 - OS-level isolation: chroot, BSD Jails, OS Containers, SELinux
- Application-Level Isolation
 - Chromium Architecture
 - Native Client

The need for isolation

- Large-scale: Multi-user systems
 - Security:
Prevent other users from reading/modifying my data...
 - Sharing:
... but allow this for certain exceptions.
 - Fair distribution of resources (CPU time / network bandwidth) among users
- Small-scale: Integrate software from differing sources
 - Web browser: websites, plugins

What do we isolate for?

- **Fault Isolation**

- A faulting application shall not take down others.


- **Resource Isolation**

- Global resources shall be distributed fairly across all users
- What is fair?

- **Security Isolation**

- Applications shall not access or modify others' data.


Separate Physical Machines



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
Separate Physical Machines

- Advantages:
 - Achieves isolation
 - Different OS/software setups
- Disadvantages:
 - Resource overcommit
 - Administration effort
 - Sharing difficult



Virtual Machines

- Idea: better resource utilization by running multiple virtual machines on a single physical




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Virtual Machine Monitor

- Provides virtual hardware environment
 - Guest OS runs as on real hardware
 - Intercept (and emulate) privileged instructions
 - Virtual devices
- Type 1 – Bare metal
 - Runs as OS directly on hardware
 - e.g., VMware ESXi, Xen
- Type 2 – hosted
 - Part of a native OS (e.g., kernel module)
 - e.g., KVM, VirtualBox


Virtual Machines for Isolation

- Advantages
 - Isolation
 - Better resource utilization
 - Different OS/SW setups
- Disadvantages
 - Management
 - Slight Performance overhead
 - Sharing still difficult




Many more implementation issues: See lectures on **Microkernel-Based Operating Systems** and **Microkernel Construction**

Isolation in a multi-user system



- Unix path name resolution
 - Each process has a lookup root (default: /)
 - `open("/foo/bar/baz")` traverses file system hierarchy starting from this root
- (Limited) ACLs to manage access rights
 - Single group/owner not sufficient for complex access policies
- Idea: Restrict users/programs' access to parts of the file system → **chroot**

Chroot: Example




- Process A:
 - Global file system access
 - `open("/bin/ls")` → returns file descriptor to `/bin/ls`
- A creates process B:

```
pid = fork();  
if (pid == 0) // child  
{  
    chroot("/var/Domain1");  
    chdir("/var/Domain1");  
    setuid(some_user);  
    execve("program B");  
}
```

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Chroot: Example



- Process B now has `/var/Domain1` set as its lookup root
 - `open("/bin/ls")` returns file descriptor to `/var/Domain1/bin/ls`
- Ideally, no access to anything outside `/var/Domain1` possible for process B
- Sharing between users:
 - Make files/directories visible in different locations (e.g. linking)

Chroot is no security mechanism!

- Chroot is meant to restrict file access of well-behaving applications
 - Intended for software testing
- No restrictions on
 - Loading kernel modules
 - Opening network connections
 - Reading `/dev/kmem`
 - Tracking other processes (e.g., through `ps / top`)

Breaking out of chroot


- Step 1: Become root
 - Find an exploit as described in last week's lecture
- Step 2:

```
fd = open(".", O_RDWR);
mkdir("./tmpdir", 0755);
chroot("./tmpdir");
fchdir(fd);
for (i = 0; i < 1024; ++i)
chdir("..");
chroot(".");
```

Breaking out of chroot

Starting as process B, `chroot`'ed to `/var/Domain1...`

`fd` `fd = fopen(".", O_RDWR);`
→ `fd` now contains valid file descriptor of `/var/Domain1`




Breaking out of chroot


Starting as process B, `chroot`'ed to `/var/Domain1...`

`fd` `fd = fopen(".", O_RDWR);`
→ `fd` now contains valid file descriptor of `/var/Domain1`

`mkdir("./tmpdir", 0755);`
→ creates new directory 'tmpdir' below current one



Breaking out of chroot



```
chroot( "./tmpdir" )
```

→ sets B's resolution root to
`/var/Domain1/tmpdir`

→ so B can't access anything above,
right?


But we still have a file descriptor
pointing outside!

```
fchdir( fd );
```

→ sets the current working
directory to `/var/Domain1`

→ this is POSIX-certified behavior

Breaking out of chroot



- Now `chdir("../")` in a long loop
- At some point we will hit the real root directory
- Now finally
`chroot("../");`
sets B's resolution root to `/`.
- Mission accomplished.

*BSD: Jails

- Based on chroot + kernel modifications
- Prohibited:
 - Loading kernel modules
 - Modify network configuration
 - (Un-)mount file systems
 - Create device nodes
 - Access kernel runtime parameters (sysctl)
- Permitted:
 - Run programs within jail (working directory...)
 - Signalling processes within a jail
 - Modification of in-jail file system
 - Bind sockets to TCP/UDP ports defined at jail creation

Jails: Implementation

- Added `jail` system call
 - Create jail structure → unmodifiable after setup
 - Attached to every process
 - Only processes within a jail can add processes to it
 - No breaking out of `chroot`
- Adapted other system calls
 - Limit PID/GID/TID-based system calls
- Had to adjust some drivers
 - e.g., virtual terminal needs to belong to specific jails


Access Control: Theory

- **Discretionary Access Control (DAC)**
 - Security (isolation) enforced based on object-subject relationship
 - Linux: File System → file ownership
- **Mandatory Access Control (MAC)**
 - Isolation based on object – (subject x operation) relationship
 - e.g., Program A with UID X may read a file;
Program B with UID X may also write it
 - central policy enforcement, no user control
- **Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)**
 - Subjects can have dynamic roles assigned
 - Access based on object-role relationship
- ***Principle of Least Privilege***

SELinux

- RBAC for Linux (co-developed by NSA...)
- Type Enforcement
 - Processes are placed in dedicated sandboxes (domains)
 - Fine-grained configuration per domain
 - Which files can be accessed? (And how?)
 - Which network ports can be bound to?
 - Can the app render to an X11 window?
 - Can the app fork() new processes? In which domain?

SELinux: Architecture



Sandboxing

SELinux: Policies

- Policy files define
 - User roles
`user joe → role user_t`
 - Object types
`dir /etc/selinux → policy_src_t`
 - Permissions
`r_dir_file(user_t, policy_src_t)`
→ `user_t` may read `policy_src_t`
- `checkpolicy` compiler generates loadable kernel module to enforce rules

Linux Security Modules (LSM)

- Loadable Kernel Modules

- ```
struct security_operations {
 [...]
 int (*file_open) (struct file *,
 const struct cred *);
 [...]
};
```

- ```
extern int register_security(  
    struct security_operations*);
```

LSM: Callback hooks

```
static int do_entry_open(struct file *f, ...,  
                        const struct cred *cred)  
{  
    [...]  
  
    error = security_file_open(f, cred);  
    if (error) { ... }  
  
    [...]  
}
```

Container-Based Virtualization

- Jails, SELinux: security isolation + some fault isolation
 - Process cannot modify state outside its jail
 - Fine-grained SELinux policies may also limit fault propagation
 - But configuration is a mess...
- Resource isolation still missing
- Enter: container-based virtual machines
 - Recent gain in popularity:
<https://linuxcontainers.org>
<http://www.docker.com>

Containers: Motivation

- Full virtualization is expensive
 - Implementation overhead
 - Need to have pass-through drivers available
 - Management overhead
 - VM configuration in addition to setup of guest OS
 - Runtime overhead (though small)
- Often we don't need all features
 - Many use cases warrant "A Linux installation"

Linux VServer

- Jails-like Linux modification
 - Extended chroot
 - Chroot barrier: prevent breaking out
 - PID / resource name spaces + filtering
 - Network isolation
 - only bind apps to predefined set of IP addresses / ports
- Share libraries / kernel across VM instances

VServer: Resource Isolation

- Goal: Fair distribution of resources (e.g. CPU time)
- But what is fair?
 - Fair share → each VM gets the same amount of compute time
 - Proportional Share → VMs with more processes get larger amount of resources
- Linux: Completely Fair Scheduler (CFS)
 - All processes get the same amount of time
 - No notion of process-VM mappings

VServer: Token-Bucket Scheduler

- Each VM has a bucket
- Every timer tick removes a token from VM's bucket
- If bucket is empty: remove all VM's processes from run queue until threshold of tokens has been refilled
- Refill: over time according to some policy
- Allows to implement proportional and fair share


VServer: I/O

- Network: use existing Linux traffic shaping mechanisms
 - Bandwidth reservations
 - Shares → specify how non-reserved bandwidth is distributed between VMs
- Disk: rely on Linux disk scheduler to do the right thing
 - Disk is less about isolation, more about optimizing accesses

Application-Level Isolation

- Complex applications → share code from different sources
 - Shared libraries
 - Plugins
 - Interpreted Languages
- Popular example: web browser
 - Flash plugin
 - JavaScript

Web-Browsing, ca. 2008




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
Monolithic Browser: Problems

- Web pages communicate through DOM
 - Unrelated page can inspect and modify data
 - Access Control: Same-Origin Policy
 - <http://www.example.com>
 - <http://www.example.com/p2>
 - <https://www.example.com>
- Web pages may include data from different sources (e.g., iframes)
- User credentials stored by browser
 - May be (mis-)used by other pages
- Per-page isolation infeasible: web apps need multiple pages
 - Calendar window
 - Email compose window
 - ...

Chromium: Isolating Web Programs




Chromium: Isolating Web Programs



Sandboxing

Web Processes



Chromium & Co.

- Isolate web pages into OS processes
- Difficult:
 - determine exact boundaries...
 - ... while maintaining compatibility
- Gain:
 - Security & Fault Isolation between web pages
 - Performance → parallel rendering possible
 - Accountability
- Enter unlimited possibilities of cloud wonderland...

Browsers & Plugins

You Tube



Microsoft®
Silverlight™



WEB.DE




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Plugin Problems


- Goals:
 - Native code execution (JIT or interpreted)
 - Access to local resources (disk, ...)
- Problems:
 - Circumvent browsers' security mechanisms
 - Arbitrary code execution possible
- Solutions
 - Ask for user approval before running plugin
 - Language-level security (e.g. Java Class Loader) → often open up new attack surface
 - Process Isolation → protects web pages, can still exploit system call interface

Native Client

- Allow plugins (**NaCl modules**) compiled to native x86 code
- **Inner Sandbox:** limit execution to module's code and data
- **Outer Sandbox:** System Call Policy Enforcement (think: SELinux)



Native Client: Application Model



NaCl Modules

- NaCl module and service runtime in same address space
 - Module code must not break out of its text/data region
 - But we need well-defined ways to
 - Perform system calls (if policy permits)
 - Communicate with web page through plugin API
- Solution: Dedicated compiler (adapted GCC) that enforces rules on NaCl modules

NaCl: Module Rules (1)

- Once loaded, the binary is not writable
 - Enforced using `mprotect()`
 - Prevents self-modifying code
- Binary is statically linked
(start address == 0, entry point = 64 kB)
 - No dynamically loaded code → allows static validation during startup
 - Predefined starting point required for load-time validation
 - Address restrictions: later

NaCl: Module Rules (2)


- All indirect control transfers use a `nacljmp` pseudo-instruction
 - Disable `ret` / function pointers → harden stack smashing
- The binary is padded up to the nearest page with at least one `hlt` instruction
 - Prevent jump to arbitrary address → will trigger `hlt`

NaCl: Module Rules (3)

- The binary contains no instructions or pseudo-instructions overlapping a 32-byte boundary
 - Alignment restrictions for indirect jumps (coming soon)
- All valid instruction addresses are reachable by disassembly that starts at the base address
 - Need access to all code for analysis
- All direct control transfers target valid instructions
 - Prevent jump into middle of instruction


NaCl: Execution/Data Confinement

- Service Runtime loads NaCl module into address space



NaCl: Execution/Data Confinement

- Service Runtime loads NaCl module into address space
- HW Segmentation restricts code and data accesses
 - Example: EIP = 0xF00BA4 translates to 0xF00BA4 + CS.Base
 - GPF on segment overrun




NaCl: Data Flow Integrity

- Problem: x86 code may jump to arbitrary address (e.g., using `ret` or `jmp *%<register>`)
- NaCl: Alignment makes sure that every 32-byte aligned address is a valid instruction
- Use `nacljmp` instead of indirect control flow:

```
and    %<reg>, 0xFFFFFFFFE0  
jmp    *%<reg>
```
- Result: code only contains jumps to valid targets
- Disallowed instructions
 - x86 segment modifications
 - `ret`
 - `syscall / int 0x*`
- No support for POSIX signals
 - They use the SS segment themselves
- Remaining issue: controlled calls into/out of the sandbox

NaCl: Out of the Sandbox



- NaCl code may jump into trampoline (32-byte aligned)
- Each 32-byte aligned word is either
 - An entry to a service routine call
 - mmap / sbrk
 - thread creation
 - Plugin API calls
 - Or a HLT instruction
- Trampoline may contain unsafe code

Native Client: Summary

- Plugins in isolated process
- Compiler enforces
 - Reliable Disassembly
- Sandbox enforces
 - Data Integrity
 - Control Flow Integrity
 - No unsafe instructions

**Result: We can play
Quake in the browser!**

Reading List

- Kamp, Watson: ***”Jails: Confining the omnipotent root”***, FreeBSD Tech Report, 2000
- Soltesz et al. ***”Container-based operating system virtualization: A scalable, high-performance alternative to hypervisors”***, EuroSys 2007
- Reis, Gribble ***”Isolating Web Programs in Modern Browser Architectures”***, EuroSys 2009
- Yee et al. ***”Native Client: A Sandbox for portable, untrusted x86 native code”***, IEEE Security & Privacy 2009
- Goldberg et al. ***”A Secure Environment for Untrusted Helper Applications”***, Usenix SSYM 1996